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Costa Rica's Struggle for Neutrality 
MAUREEN DUNN 
''T he Contra Killed My Dad-
dy,'' read the headlines in one Costa 
Rican newspaper in mid 1983. Six 
"campesinos" in the border town of 
Upala are murdered by Pastora's 
ARDE men. Upala is attacked. War-
lordism on the border increases. FE-
SIAN (La Federacion Sindical Agraria 
Nacional), a peasant group, charges 
that private armies are attacking set-
tlements of ''precaristas,'' legal squat-
ters, on a U.S. citizen-owned ranch. 
Once unheard of, these kinds of violent 
and often politically related crimes are 
becoming more common in Costa 
Rica. Though not to be compared with 
the death squads of El Salvador and 
Guatemala, or even of the police 
abuses of Honduras, Costa Rica's non-
militaristic, tranquil posture is being 
threatened by increased militarization 
of its police forces, violence by 
deserted contras, warlordism of North 
American ranchers, and the potential 
of defeated contras and frustrated 
ranchers turning their guns and antag-
onism against supposed "subversives" 
in their own neighborhoods. 
The Costa Rican Commission of 
Human Rights (CODEHU) reported 
for 1985, owing mainly to the impunity 
with which the contras move about in 
the northern border area, violent evic-
tions in the northern zones by the 
Costa Rican Rural Guard of more than 
two hundred squatter families. Many 
of these were detained, including 
women and minors, put in cells with 
drunks and common criminals and 
threatened with beatings. Later, the 
Commission confirmed cases of con-
stant harrassment by the "guardia" 
who were seen accompanied by armed, 
paid guards of the area's large ran-
chers. Detentions and confiscation of 
documents at airports and immigration 
posts at the borders have been reported 
by human rights groups, religious 
organizations, the Womens' Alliance 
of Costa Rica, the Christian Movement 
for Peace, the Evangelical Church, a 
member of the Institute of Social and 
Economic Analysis of Brazil, many 
youth members of the Vanguard party, 
the small, legal communist party of 
Costa Rica and even youth members of 
the National Liberation Party, the pre-
sent ruling party. 
A Costa Rican who works in devel-
opment with women's groups, told me 
that the disappearances, robberies and 
murders are more numerous than 
believed. The Costa Rican Guard is 
unable to check all cases and many go 
unreported for fear of reprisal. Many 
families simply abandon their plots 
and move farther south, thus adding to 
the number of displaced that are found 
in Costa Rican cities. In an interview 
with Steve Rubin of The Village Voice, 
Ronaldo Campos, a peasant organizer 
with the Popular Vanguard party, ex-
plains what happens when campesinos, 
hearing so much about Sandinistas in-
vading, see fighting or other activity 
near the border towns where they live. 
"They go to report the invasion. 
Sometimes there is an investigation. 
They find the encampment and ARDE 
[Nicaraguan Eden Pastora's counter-
revolutionary group that operates on 
the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border] has 
to go back into Nicaragua. Or there is 
no investigation and someone tells 
ARDE who made the report. In both 
cases there is a visit to the campesino. 
Maybe he changes his story . . . maybe 
he remembers everything .... " But 
in any case, he points out, it goes badly 
for the peasant, and he imitates a 
shooting through the throat (The 
Village Voice, December 24, 1985). 
Captured weapons caches, revela-
tions by arrested and jailed U.S. 
operatives working with the contras, a 
bombing during a press conference 
with Pastora that left one U.S. jour-
nalist dead and others wounded, U.S. 
ranchers' overt ties to the CIA and 
contra financing, and charges of drug 
trafficking by contra leaders working 
out of Costa Rica set the stage for a 
drama that rivals any espionage novel. 
Costa Rican neutrality is being put to 
the test-it is ''being subtly deprived of 
its own traditions," laments Peter 
Duis berg, a U.S. scientist living in 
Costa Rica (The Tico Times, Septem-
ber 20, 1985). 
Yet, Costa Ricans stand firm in their 
belief and commitment to military 
neutrality and have admirably attempt-
ed to avoid becoming embroiled in the 
East-West power struggle that tugs at 
their Central American neighbors. On 
February 2, 1986, Dr. Oscar Arias San-
chez of the National Liberation Party, 
the candidate who favored preserving 
this small democracy's rare legacy of 
miliary neutrality, won the presidency 
by 52 percent of the vote. The Presi-
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dent-elect has not been reluctant to 
speak out against U.S. aid to the con-
tras and against contra use of Costa 
Rican soil to launch attacks in border-
ing Nicaragua: 
'' If I were Mr. Reagan, I would give 
that money to Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica 
for economic aid and not military aid 
to the contras ... the result with the 
aid to the contras has been a more 
dictatorial, more totalitarian govern-
ment in the north [Nicaragua]" (The 
Tico Times, February 21, 1986). 
Pressing Costa Rica for over five 
years now to align itself more openly 
with U.S. military policy in the region 
in hopes of securing full military 
cooperation from all states bordering 
Nicaragua, the Reagan administration, 
concerned by Arias' challenge to U.S. 
policy, has stepped up pressure on the 
newly-elected leader. A Costa Rican 
government source reported that U.S. 
officials informed Monge of the 
Reagan administration's displeasure 
with Arias (Washington Post, April 13, 
1986) and shortly after Dr. Arias made 
his remarks, U.S. Undersecretary of 
Defense, William Taft went to Costa 
Rica to meet with President-elect 
and President Monge. After the House 
defeated the contra aid measure on 
March 20, 1986, Elliott Abrams, Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, accompanied by 
General John Galvin, head of the 
Southern Command met with Monge 
in San Jose. Costa Rican officials, in-
cluding Eduardo Lisano, Executive 
President of the Central Bank, feel that 
the Administration is delaying U.S. aid 
to put pressure on Arias. They cite the 
fact that no payments of fiscal 1986 
funds have been made to Costa Rica 
yet (Washington Post, April 13, 1986). 
Costa Ricans have referred proudly 
to their nation as a geopolitical acci-
dent. They boast of having a system of 
socialized medicine, limited land 
reform, ninety-percent literacy, a thriv-
ing middle-class, the oldest continuous 
parliamentary democracy in Central 
America and of unarmed democracy. 
Founded by dissenters from Spain who 
wanted to be far from the Spanish 
Captain Generals in Guatemala, Costa 
Rica was a poor country where Spanish 
settlers and Governors alike had to 
work their own land to survive. There 
was no aristocracy and as a result, a 
kind of agrarian democracy developed 
(though some began to prosper more 
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than others with the advent of large 
scale coffee cultivation). Nevertheless, 
Costa Rica continued to be poor; most 
of the population lived below sub-
sistence level. Those better off dis-
missed the poverty, reminding 
themselves that Costa Ricans still lived 
better than their neighbors. 
During the 1940's, two prominent 
political figures emerged who dramati-
cally influenced the future of Costa 
Rican society: Rafael Angel Calderon 
Guardia, a medical doctor of great per-
sonal popularity; Jose Figueres Ferrer, 
a well-to-do self-made agriculturist. 
Guardia, elected President by an over-
whelming majority in 1940, tried to 
negate the criticisms of the Com-
munists, represented by Mora 
Valverde's Block of Workers and 
Peasants, and to persuade the 
wealthier class of the necessity for 
reforms. He proposed tax revision, 
rural credit and land distribution, 
development of the Atlantic region 
(then abandoned by the colonial em-
pire of United Fruit), a low-cost hous-
ing program, founding of a national 
university and a social security system. 
However, World War II had a pro-
found effect on implementing Guar-
dia's programs. Trade with Western 
Europe was disrupted and Costa Rica 
was pressured by the U.S. to export to 
the Panama Canal Zone. Shortages for 
capital goods and manufactured ar-
ticles brought about inflation which 
was further aggravated by the heavy 
cost of building the Pan American 
Highway. 
As an ally of the Soviet Union in the 
fight against Fascism, the U.S. en-
couraged national communist parties 
to collaborate with their democratic 
governments. For Guardia, this meant 
an alliance with Mora's communist 
party and an acceleration of his pro-
posed reforms. But Guardia became 
gradually criticized for electoral fraud 
in subsequent elections and for his 
communist associations. The Opposi-
tion, influenced at this time by the U.S. 
cold war, boycotted sessions in Con-
gress and intensified its propaganda 
against the communists. Meanwhile, in 
1944, Jose Figueres, exiled in Mexico 
for his outspoken opposition to the 
presidency, returned to Costa Rica and 
with his flamboyant speaking tours 
and strong international connections 
was able to gain wide support. 
In 1948, when Otilio Ulate, a 
moderate conservative aligned with 
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Figueres, was elected by 54 percent of 
the vote, Guardia supporters in the na-
tional assembly annulled the elections 
and arrested Ulate. In the end, 
Figueres was successful in launching a 
military takeover of the government 
and establishing a provisional junta 
which within 18 months had nation-
alized the banks, imposed a ten percent 
tax on private capital and established a 
state owned electric power institute. It 
became surprisingly clear that 
Figueres' Social Democrats were more 
socialist than the regime they replaced. 
In a formal ceremony in December 
1948, the Junta's Minister of War and 
Public Security proclaimed the aboli-
tion of the army and handed over the 
keys of the army barracks to the 
Minister for Education. In reflecting 
on this historical event, Rodrigo 
Carazo Odio, President of the Peace 
University and former President of 
Costa Rica, reminds us that "it is im-
portant to remember that this was not 
a defeated army, but a victorious one. 
Today, people such as myself have 
become fully convinced that a country 
that organizes an army becomes its 
own jailer .... '' (Andrew Reding, in 
World Policy Journal, Spring 1986, p. 
331). 
Until very recently, Costa Rica's 
security has relied on the Inter-
American defense system and a modest 
uniformed force of 15,000 rural and 
Continued on page Six 
ILLEGITIMATI AUIIIORIT~ 
,_,....,, IM,-,,J uw.,, """ "61 
The Resist Newsletter is published ten 
times a year by Resist, Inc., One 
Summer Street, Somerville, MA 
02144. (617) 623-5110. 
Resist staff: Nancy Wechsler 
Nancy Moniz 
Ken Tangvik 
Typesetting: Vicki Gabriner 
Gay Community News 
Printing: Red Sun Press .... 
May/June 1986 
The Nicaraguan Constitutional 
Process 
GEORGE VICKERS 
Except for the metal detector 
through which participants had to 
pass, there was nothing outwardly 
unusual about the gathering of legal 
scholars and academics from around 
the United States at New York Univer-
sity Law School the weekend of April 
18-20. The two-hundredth anniversary 
of the United States Constitution will 
be celebrated in 1987, so it was not sur-
prising to find a large national con-
ference discussing the mechanics of 
drafting a constitution. 
What was going on inside the hall 
was anything but ordinary, however. 
For the constitutional process being ex-
amined was the one currently under-
way to produce a new Nicaraguan con-
s titu ti on. The NYU conference 
brought together North American 
scholars and a special joint delegation 
of the Nicaraguan National Assembly 
and the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. 
The Nicaraguans had requested the 
meeting to get comments on the recent-
ly completed first draft of the new 
Nicaraguan constitution from scholars 
familiar with the U.S. constitutional 
experience. The Nicaraguan delegation 
included not only Sandinista represen-
tatives, but also key leaders of 
Nicaraguan political parties that are 
pro-capitalist and anti-Sandinista in 
orientation. 
Despite efforts by organizers to 
publicize the meeting (sponsors includ-
ed Rutgers University, The City Uni-
versity of New York, the Society of 
American Law Teachers, and the Latin 
American Studies Association), there 
was a media blackout of the confer-
ence. What little coverage did appear 
(the New York Times ran a story a 
week after the conference ended) fo-
cused on opposition criticisms of the 
Sandinistas rather than on describing 
the constitutional process underway in 
Nicaragua. In the face of Reagan Ad-
ministration warnings that the Sandin-
istas were carrying out a ''disinforma-
tion campaign" to deceive U.S. public 
opinion, it is not surprising that the 
media chose to ignore the NYU con-
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ference. Any coverage of the actual 
proceedings would have made it obvi-
ous that Administration descriptions 
of Nicaragua as a Communist, totali-
tarian State are contradicted both by 
the substance of the constitutional 
framework under discussion and the 
process through which a new constitu-
tional order is emerging. 
On the contrary, the draft Nicara-
guan constitution is a quite unique 
document that seeks to merge the em-
phasis on political pluralism, separa-
tion of powers, and individual rights 
found in many "Western democra-
cies,'' with the emphasis on social and 
economic justice found in many 
Socialist countries. In doing so, it pro-
jects a governmental and political 
structure very different from that of 
regimes governed by Communist par-
ties. 
Key Elements of the Draft 
Constitution 
The difference between the 
Nicaraguan constitutional framework 
and that of typical Communist coun-
tries is evident in the preamble to the 
constitution, which sets forth certain 
"fundamental principles," including a 
commitment to political pluralism, a 
mixed economy, and non-alignment. 
Where the Cuban constitution (to take 
one example of a ''Communist con-
stitution") recognizes only the Com-
munist Party and institutionalizes the 
Party as the highest force both in the 
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State and in society, the Nicaraguan 
constitution guarantees the right to 
organize political parties "with the ob-
ject, among others, of aspiring to ob-
tain political power.'' Where the 
Cuban constitution speaks of a 
socialist economy as its goal, the 
Nicaraguan draft constitution permits 
a mixture of state owned, private, and 
cooperative ownership, and authorizes 
''the establishment of reasonable pro-
fit margins." Where the Cuban con-
stitution declares that Cuba is part of 
the "world socialist community," the 
Nicaraguan draft expresses opposition 
to "the existence of military blocks and 
alliances. '' 
Unlike the constitutions of Cuba and 
the USSR, which emphasize the ''unity 
of powers," the draft Nicaraguan con-
stitution resembles that of the United 
States with its emphasis on a separa-
tion of powers. While substantially 
weaker than the U.S. constitution in 
terms of "checks and balances," the 
draft does provide for Executive veto 
of legislation, legislative override of 
such veto by 60% of the Assembly, and 
judicial review of executive and legi-
slative decision. 
In many respects the draft constitu-
tion goes beyond the U.S. Constitution 
in iterating human rights guarantees. 
In the key section on "Rights, Duties 
and Guarantees of the Nicaraguan 
People,'' the document spells out in 
considerable detail not only the rights 
Continued on page Four 
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we associate with our Bill of Rights, 
but many additional rights that do not 
enjoy constitutional protection in the 
United States. Among the individual 
and civil rights guaranteed under the 
draft are: the right to life (no death 
penalty); personal liberty (no arbitrary 
detention or imprisonment); equality 
before the law; freedom of expression, 
movement, conscience and religion; 
and criminal procedure guarantees 
(presumption of innocence, habeas 
corpus, speedy trial, avoidance of self-
incrimination and double jeopardy, 
right to counsel, etc.). This draft also 
guarantees ''political rights'' including 
assembly, political organizing, petition 
of grievances, etc. 
While most North Americans would 
recognize these individual and political 
rights as similar to those in the U.S. 
Constitution, the draft also defines 
fundamental social and economic 
rights that have equal status. Among 
these are the ''right to nourishment,'' 
''right to health,'' ''right to housing,'' 
"right to work," and "right to strike." 
In all these areas the constitution re-
quires the State to observe and guar-
antee these rights. Article 111 
specifically requires that ''the State 
shall set forth the necessary corrective 
measures in order to achieve an equita-
ble distribution of wealth and income 
among all citizens." 
Unresolved Issues 
Although the general framework of 
constitutional democracy described in 
the draft constitution seems to enjoy 
support from all the parties repre-
sented in the Nicaraguan National 
Assembly, there are some key issues 
that must be resolved before it will be 
clear whether the constitution finally 
adopted will be perceived within Nica-
ragua as a national, rather than a San-
dinista, document. 
The most fundamental unresolved 
issue in the draft is a tension between 
''participatory'' and ''representative'' 
forms of democracy. The draft defines 
the form of government as, "a demo-
cratic, participatory, representative 
and non-aligned Republic." Specific 
articles reflecting the concept of par-
ticipatory democracy require the State 
to see that mass organizations 
representing agricultural and other 
workers have a role in the planning, 
oversight, and control of measures that 
effect them. Other articles authorize 
popular militias and require ''popular 
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participation'' in the organization and 
administration of justice. 
Alongside these references to par-
ticipatory mechanisms, the draft con-
stitution elaborates a relatively 
straightforward ''representative'' 
structure of government, with 
legislative, executive, judicial, and 
electoral branches. The draft leaves 
unclear the relationship between these 
representative organs and the par-
ticipatory mechanisms ref erred to 
elsewhere. 
All of the opposition parties believe 
(probably correctly) that popular par-
ticipation by · mass organizations in 
State activities will strengthen San-
dinista control because of FSLN in-
fluence in the mass organizations. As a 
result, they want the form of govern-
ment to follow more closely traditional 
representative democratic institutions, 
and to clearly limit popular participa-
tion to a consultative role. 
From the comments of both San-
dinista and opposition representatives 
at the NYU conference, it seems clear 
that the FSLN has not, as a party, 
made a final decision on the balance 
between participatory and represen-
tative forms. While they believe it is 
essential to provide a role for mass 
organizations in order to maintain sup-
port and enthusiasm for the revolu-
tionary process, they also desire as 
broad a base of political support as 
possible for the constitutional structure 
that emerges. To the extent that con-
tinued support for the constitutional 
process by opposition parties requires 
compromises on ''popular participa-
tion,'' some fundamental decisions 
have yet to be taken by the FSLN 
leadership. 
Another area of unresolved 
disagreements involves the separation 
of powers and system of checks and 
balances set forth in the draft. 
Although the draft constitution 
establishes a separation of powers be-
tween legislative, executive, judicial, 
and electoral branches, the powers of 
the executive are far greater than those 
of the executive under the U.S. Con-
stitution. The President of Nicaragua, 
under the draft, has the power to pro-
pose and approve the national budget, 
to unilaterally declare war, and to 
declare a State of Emergency under 
which major portions of the Constitu-
tion can be suspended. The National 
Assembly has the power to review the 
budget, to "solicit reports and ex-
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amine" Ministers (but not to censure 
them), and to ratify or modify the 
State of Emergency within ninety days 
(except in time of war, when no 
ratification is necessary). The Presi-
dent appoints the Mayor of Managua, 
and (as in the U.S.) nominates 
Supreme Court justices for approval 
by the National Assembly. The term of 
office for judges is, however, coter-
minous with that of the National 
Assembly. 
The emphasis on a strong executive 
branch in part reflects the tendency of 
all Latin democracies to favor a strong 
executive, but it also reflects a belief on 
the part of many Nicaraguan leaders 
that the overthrow of Salvador Allende 
in Chile demonstrated how formal 
mechanisms like separation of powers 
can be used to undermine the very 
framework of democracy. During the 
Allende period the Chilean Supreme 
Court declared unconstitutional more 
than thirty-five laws passed by Con-
gress and approved by the President. 
The concern that constitutional 
separation of powers should not under-
mine the popular will is not limited to 
the Sandinistas. The leader of the Con-
servative Democratic Party, respond-
ing to some North American criticisms 
of executive power in the draft, said at 
the conference that "any President 
who is elected should be able to carry 
out the program of his campaign." At 
the same time, opposition members 
favor some strengthening of the 
powers of the National Assembly. It 
seems likely that the final draft will, at 
the very least, expand the powers of the 
National Assembly and limit the power 
of the President to unilaterally declare 
war. 
The chief concern of the opposition 
parties, as reflected in their concern 
about "participatory democracy," is 
that at present there is not a clear line 
of demarcation between State organs 
and the FSLN. Given the present 
dominance of the FSLN, they want the 
constitution to clearly state that 
government officials, public servants, 
and the armed forces must be nonpar-
tisan, and that party identifications 
must be removed from public offices 
or activities. For the same reason, they 
resist any formulation that would give 
Sandinista controlled mass organiza-
tions a formal role in government 
decision-making or administration. 
Continued on next page 
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The draft now under discussion is 
very much a first draft, and the 
unresolved issues described above 
make it clear that some significant 
changes are likely before the final 
adoption of a new constitution next 
January. The first draft reviewed at the 
NYU conference is the outgrowth of a 
formal constitution process that has 
been underway for almost a year, but 
there are several steps scheduled before 
a final draft will be adopted. Indeed, 
there is some uncertainty about how 
the final decision will be made. 
The drafting of the constitution is 
the responsibility and principal func-
tion of the 96 member National 
Assembly elected in November, 1984. 
Last May, the Assembly approved a 
structure and process for the drafting. 
It formed a Special Constitutional 
Commission to oversee the entire con-
stitutional process. The commission 
has twenty-two assembly members 
representing all seven political parties. 
Twelve of the commission members are 
from the FSLN, while ten are from op-
po sit ion parties including the 
Democratic Party (PCD), Liberal In-
dependent Party (PLI), Popular Social 
Christian Party (PPSC), Nicaraguan 
Socialist Party (PSN), Communist 
Party of Nicaragua (PC de N), and 
Marxist-Leninist Popular Action 
Movement (MAP-ML). 
Three sub-commissions were formed 
to assist the Special Constitutional 
Commission. The Sub-Committee on 
the Exterior was created to examine 
constitutions of other countries as 
possible models. That sub-commission 
organized delegations last Fall that 
visited other Latin American countries, 
Western European nations including 
France, Germany, and England, and 
several Eastern European countries. 
The NYU meeting was another in these 
consultations to consider the Nicara-
guan constitution in the light of other 
constitutional experiments. 
The Sub-Commission on National 
Consultation was created to organize 
two rounds of national dialogue on the 
constitution. The first round included 
formal presentations last August and 
September by political parties (in-
cluding two that boycotted the 
assembly elections) on ideas for what 
the constitution should contain. After 
these presentations, more informal 
meetings were held with representatives 
of unions, professional organizations, 
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and other popular and mass organiza-
tions throughout the Fall. A second 
round of national debate is scheduled 
for next month to get responses to the 
first draft of the constitution. 
A third sub-commission, the Sub-
Commission on Constitutional Af-
fairs, was created to take the input 
from the other sub-commissions and 
prepare the actual draft for considera-
tion. This sub-commission also re-
ceived input from the Supreme Court. 
On February 21, 1986, the Special 
Constitutional Commission formally 
submitted a first draft of the new con-
stitution to the National Assembly. 
While not all members of the commis-
sion agree with every article as now 
written, they did agree that sufficient 
agreement on an overall framework 
had been reached to allow the process 
to move to the next round of national 
debate. 
After the next round of national 
dialogue, a new draft will be prepared 
and submitted to the National Assem-
bly for approval. That final approval 
process should begin in September or 
October, and is expected to last until 
January 7, 1987. Under the present 
rules, Articles will be voted on in-
dividually, and final approval of the 
constitution will require a 60% vote in 
favor by the National Assembly. Op-
position parties have called for an 
alternative approval process, however, 
involving a national referendum on the 
final draft approved by the Assembly. 
To most of the North American par-
ticipants in the NYU conference there 
was a certain sense of unreality in 
discussing with Nicaraguan represent-
atives their draft constitution while, in 
Washington, the U.S. Congress was 
debating when and how much military 
aid to provide towards the overthrow 
of the Nicaraguan government. In the 
end, decisions made in Washington 
will certainly have far more influence 
on the political character of Nicara-
guan society than any advice from 
North American academics. 
Haywood Burns, Director of the 
CUNY Center for Legal Education, 
compared the NYU conference to sit-
ting down with the Founding Fathers 
to discuss how much power to give the 
federal government. While that may be 
a bit dramatic, there is certainly a 
degree of irony in the fact that the fate 
of the Nicaraguan constitutional pro-
cess may be strongly influenced by the 
degree to which the checks and bal-
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ances provided in our own two hun-
dred year old constitution still have any 
life. 
George Vickers is a member of the 
Resist board. 
SPANISH LANGUAGE 




We are pleased to announce a 
women's introductory language course 
on cassette tape, "Gritando Otra Ver-
dad: Shouting Another Truth." This 
course is especially designed for US 
women who share their Central Ameri-
can sisters' yearning for peace and will-
ingness to struggle for freedom. 
Available in January 1986, the eight 
lessons also include song and poetry by 
Latin American women. Lessons are 
read by native speakers. The two Span-
ish cassette tapes and the 75-page 
Study Booklet contain relevant dia-
logues, vocabulary, oral exercises of 
increasing difficulty and informative 
sketches about women's groups in the 
region. 
The cost of this unique resource is 
$20. It can be ordered from the Center 
for Educational Design and Communi-
cation, 821 Varnum Street N.E., 
Washington, DC 20017. Payment 
(check or money order) must accom-
pany order. Please make check payable 
to: Center for Educational Design. 
I The Resist Pledge System l 
The most important source of Resist's 
income is monthly pledges. Pledges 
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us 
a minimum monthly income. In turn, 
pledges receive a monthly reminder let-
ter (in addition to the newsletter) which 
contains news of recent grants and 
other Resist activities. So take the 
plunge and become a Resist pledge! 
Yes, I would like to pledge S 
monthly to the work of Resist. 
Name ___________ _ 
Address __________ _ 
City ___ State __ Zip ___ _ 
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civil guards who do everything from 
search and rescue to traffic control. 
With each presidential election, the 
guards retire and the ranks are filled by 
the party in power just like any other 
political position. This arrangement is 
gradually being changed as Costa Rica 
moves dangerously close to establish-
ing a permanent military force. Last 
May, the Minister of Public Security, 
Benjamin Piza, asked the U.S., with-
out first informing President Monge, 
to train 700 Costa Rican civil guards-
men into a rapid reaction force. On a 
ranch only miles from the Nicaraguan 
border and on Costa Rica's deepest 
natural water port (allowing rapid ac-
cess to Nicaragua's Pacific Coast), 22 
U.S. Green Berets instruct the guard-
smen in tactical communications, the 
use of M-16 automatic rifles, M60 
machine guns, 50-caliber machine 
guns, 81 mm mortars and 90mm 
recoiless rifles. Costa Rican officials 
repeatedly deny forming a permanent 
military force, thus violating neutrali-
ty. Yet, during the presidential cam-
paigns last year, both candidates 
pledged to retain the U.S. trained 
''Lightning Brigade'' and not subject it 
to the patronage system. 
Public Security Minister Benjamin 
Piza asserts that the special force is 
necessary to respond to the potential 
threat of left-wing guerrillas trained in 
Nicaragua. (And indeed, in early May 
1985, U.S. State Department spokes-
man, Edward Djerejian, announced in 
Washington that 200 Costa Rican 
''leftists'' had gone to Nicaragua to 
fight alongside the Sandinistas. When 
Costa Rica's Security Council asked 
the U.S. Embassy for proof, the State 
Department could not substantiate it). 
(The New York Times, May 19, 1985). 
Critics of U.S. training, however, 
believe the U.S. was behind Costa 
Rica, pushing for the "ok" to bring in 
advisers in order to get a secure 
foothold in the country. Former Public 
Security Minister, Juan Jose Echever-
ria, warns of another possible scenario 
as a consequence of military training: 
Due to the deteriorating economic 
situation in the country, the conser-
vative sectors of Costa Rica ''will need 
a strong police force for repression" 
(Philadelphia Inquirer, August 12, 
1985). And political analysts predict 
that if the "guardia" are trained and 
armed to the degree of El Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan armies, they will 
become more repressive and as a result, 
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Costa Rican guardsmen in training on the Costa Rica/Nicaragua 
border, May 1985. 
opposition groups will inevitably take 
up arms. 
Long before the U.S. military ad-
visers were invited, Costa Rica's 
neutrality was under attack. In 1981, 
former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick admonished Costa Rican 
officials; if they did not raise an army, 
they might well forfeit U.S. economic 
assistance. Outraged by such overt in-
terference, President Carazo demand-
ed two letters of apology. 
That same year security assistance to 
Costa Rica was renewed after a thir-
teen year lapse. Before Monge took of-
fice in 1982, he was approached by the 
CIA to set up secret camps to train 
Nicaraguan exiles-on a short term 
basis, he was assured, since the contras 
were sure to win within six months. 
When the U.S. army offered to have 
1,000 U.S. National Guardsmen build 
a network of roads along the border 
with Nicaragua, Costa Ricans pro-
tested and President Monge again said 
absolutely not. At the same time that 
President Reagan visited Costa Rica in 
December 1982, the Minister of Public 
Security announced the formation of a 
reserve paramilitary force of 10,000 
civilians (Organizacion para Emergen-
cia Nacional) trained in use of light 
weapons and emergency tactics, such 
as crowd control. Since 1983, 500 civil 
guards have been trained by the U.S. in 
Panama and in Fort Benning, Georgia 
(The Financial Times, February 28, 
1985) and U.S. battleships have fre-
quented Costa Rican ports, making 
"goodwill" visits-most recently, this 
past February. Despite Monge's 
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previous denials of U.S. offers for 
road building assistance, this past 
February, 182 U.S. army engineers 
came to Costa Rica to build bridges 
and improve the Costa Nera Sur road 
on the Pacific Coast. Opposed by 
Costa Rican peace groups and the 
Costa Rican engineering association 
(who demanded the engineers meet the 
same criteria for employment as Costa 
Rican engineers), the improvement 
project will cut travel time from Costa 
Rica's southern border to the northern 
one by one-third. 
While disapproving of U.S. aid to 
the contras and the trade embargo 
against Nicaragua, former President 
Monge quietly acquiesced to a growing 
U.S. influence: $1.2 million per day in 
U.S. aid; a nearly $7 million jump in 
U.S. military aid from 1983 to 1985; an 
increase of U.S. embassy staff from 35 
in 1983 to 150 at present. A recently 
approved U.S. counter-terrorism pro-
gram, which abolishes prohibitions on 
police training in Latin America (in-
stituted in 1974 when the Congress 
learned that U.S. trained security 
forces were involved in torture and 
massacres against their own people) 
will give Costa Rica eligibility for 
military training and ''specific articles 
for use in military counterinsurgency 
operations" (Report of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate on S. 960, International Securi-
ty and Development Cooperation Act 
of 1985, Report 99-34, April 19, 1985, 
p. 39). 
In spite of Monge's strong as-
surances that Costa Rica's pacifist 
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principles remain intact, many fear the 
"Central Americanization" of Costa 
Rica is just a matter of time. "You can 
only say 'No' to a generous friend so 
many times,'' remarks one Costa 
Rican official (The New York Times, 
July 19, 1985). 
There are three seasons in Costa 
Rica: the rainy season, the dry season, 
and the season of fighting with the 
Nicaraguans, so goes a local saying. 
Historical tensions with Nicaragua go 
back to 1948 and 1949 when Somoza 
sent soldiers to aid Calderon Guardia 
against Figueres. In 1977, Somoza pro-
voked a confrontation which nearly 
killed a Costa Rican government 
minister. Though the government of-
ficially opposes contra activities along 
the border, many Costa Ricans are 
sympathetic to Nicaraguans who op-
pose the Nicaraguan government-as 
they were to rebels opposing Somoza in 
the late 70's-and turn a blind eye to 
Eden Pastora and Fernando Chamor-
ro's use of national territory for a base 
of operations. 
As squirmishes occurred between 
Nicaraguan soldiers and contra bands, 
accusations between the two nations 
flew and amicable relations grew in-
creasingly more strained. Fueled by a 
right-wing press, backed by the conser-
vative business sector and the anti-
Communist paramilitary Free Costa 
Rica Movement, anti-Nicaragua sen-
timents hit a "hysteria" high last year 
when in May two Costa Rican civil 
guardsmen were killed in a border con-
frontation. An OAS investigation 
determined that the shots came from 
Nicaragua but could not prove if the 
aggressors were contras or Sandinistas. 
Costa Rica then refused to accept a 
newly-appointed Nicaraguan ambas-
sador and demanded an explanation 
for the shooting. A mob of 500 Costa 
Ricans stormed the Nicaraguan Em-
bassy, tearing down its flag and 
shouting anti-Sandinista slogans. The 
press stepped up its rhetoric, attacking 
not only Sandinistas but peace and 
human rights groups, academics and 
U.S. groups opposed to contra fund-
ing. Rafael Fournier Calderon, 
presidential candidate from the Social 
Christian Unity Party came out public-
ly in favor of U.S. aid to the contras 
and pledged to send Costa Rica's civil 
guards to fight alongside Honduras in 
the event of a conflict with Nicaragua. 
A poll taken by an affiliate of Gallup 
International after the border incident 
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showed that the majority of Costa 
Ricans disapproved of the Sandinista 
regime and favored U.S. funding to the 
contras. 
During the earlier stages of presiden-
tial campaigns, Oscar Arias kept silent 
on the issue of neutrality. Meanwhile, 
on the second annivesary of his origi-
nal presidential proclamation of 
neutrality in 1983, President Monge in-
troduced a bill to the national assembly 
that would reaffirm the nation's 
"perpetual, active and unarmed" 
neutrality. Then late in the campaign, 
Arias came out strongly in favor of 
neutrality-"effective neutrality as the 
basis of our peace"; to fight for 
negotiated and political solutions, not 
military ones'' (Aportes, March/ April 
1986, San Jose, Costa Rica, p. 6)-and 
his party, the National Liberation Par-
ty (PLN) conducted a survey, in-
dicating that the majority of Costa 
Ricans, no matter how much they dis-
liked the Sandinistas, did not favor go-
ing to war against them. 
While debating contra aid two 
months ago, the Reagan administra-
tion quoted the results of a survey com-
missioned by the United States Infor-
mation Agency (USIA) that showed 
that 69 percent of Costa Ricans sup-
port U.S. aid to the contras. The poll, 
announced in the San Jose conser-
vative La Nacion and quoted by 
former U.S. ambassador to the U.N., 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, by contra leader 
Alfonso Robelo and by special negotia-
tor for the Reagan administration, 
Philip Habib, was taken last July when 
emotions ran high over the killing of 
the two Costa Rican guards. A second 
part of that same survey, taken in No-
vember 1985 showed dramatically 
lower figures. Victor Ramirez, a prom-
inent pollster and political strategist 
for President Oscar Arias said his polls 
show less than 10 percent of Costa 
Ricans support the U.S. position and 
that the USIA sampling method had an 
intended specific purpose: "The only 
thing I can think of is that they are just 
manipulating the American people, us-
ing these kinds of results in order to 
favor Reagan policies about this 
issue." (Tony Avirgan for National 
Public Radio in San Jose, March 24, 
1986). 
In February, Nicaraguan President 
Daniel Ortega officially acknowledged 
that Sandinista soldiers killed the two 
Costa Rican guardsmen in May 1985 
and diplomatic relations between the 
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two nations resumed. In a move to 
''leave Mr. Arias a clean slate on which 
to write his own policy toward the San-
dinistas" (Christian Science Monitor, 
February 27, 1986), Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua signed a pact to set up an in-
spection and vigilance commission on 
their mutual border. Contadora and 
support group countries will supply 
vehicles and materials for border 
patrols and petition other countries for 
financial assistance. Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua will supply food and hous-
ing for commission members. Many 
are skeptical, citing previous failures of 
such commissions due to violent in-
cidents on the border and lack of 
material support. Leaders of both 
countries, however, view the plan as a 
sign of the political will of Central 
Americans to solve their problems on 
their own. "We are showing once 
again that there is a desire for peace 
among Central Americans,'' said 
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega 
(CSM, February 27, 1986). "Although 
the installations of the commission 
may not please the United States, I am 
very sorry," asserted President Monge, 
"but this time, as on many other occa-
sions, this deals with a sovereign deci-
sion of Costa Rica" (La Nacion, 
March 11, 1986). 
To a multitude of applause on the 
eve of his victory, Oscar Arias prom-
ised to serve the humble, fully incor-
porate women, redirect the economy to 
satisfy the most needy, distribute 
political power, fight for greater 
economic democracy, fight against 
corruption and finally to def end and 
revitalize Costa Rican peace. But as 
many economic analysts see it, the 
country doesn't offer many realistic 
possibilities to increase production ex-
cept through doubling of U.S. aid. 
Though the drop in oil prices and the 
rise in coffee prices will give President 
Arias some breathing room, this will 
not be enough to remedy an economy 
that dedicates almost 35 percent of the 
value of its exports to pay the interest 
on the foreign debt, now reaching $4 
billion. President Monge, negotiating 
austerity measures with the IMF in 
1983, was successful in weathering the 
economic crisis of the early 80's but 
President Arias will have to confront 
structural economic problems that 
threaten the very foundations of Costa 
Rica's social democratic welfare state. 
In his article outlining the Reagan 
Continued on next page 
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Veterans for Peace, P.O. Box 3881, 
Portland, ME 04104. 
Veterans for Peace was organized 
in 1985 by Maine vets who firmly 
support Charles Clement's quote: 
''Veterans-as those who have fought 
in wars or served in the military-are 
our most potent resource for peace.'' 
The vets believe that there is a 
desperate need to do outreach to 
other veterans, because veterans who 
have reached a stage in their recovery 
or development that allows them to 
find peace within themselves, discover 
that the tradition veterans' organiza-
tions fail to address their concerns, 
and this is especially true of combat 
veterans. Likewise, many military 
veterans have a great deal of difficul-
ty acclimating themselves to the at-
mosphere within which the traditional 
non-veteran peace-advocacy organiza-
tions exist because they perceive the 
differences in personal perspectives as 
overwhelming. In the past this 
perception has discouraged many 
veterans from being actively involved 
in peace-advocacy work. Reversing 
this misconception, and providing the 
motivation and means for military 
veterans to educate the general public 
with respect to the unaccepted cost of 
wars and weaponry, is their primary 
goal. One of the organization's pro-
jects is the VFP Newsletter which is 
viewed as the most practical and 
economic means of maintaining com 
munication and solidarity, and will 
serve to further motivate "at-large" 
members to establish state chapters, 
participate in recruitment drives as 
well as VFP educational and protest 
activities, facilitate coordination of 
activities and provide a medium for 
the exchange of ideas and informa-
tion. Resist's grant went towards 
helping to defray the costs of the 
newsletter. 
Leonard Peltier Support House, P.O. 
Box 6130, Kansas City, KS 66106. 
The Leonard Peltier Support House 
was organized and is maintained by a 
small group of Leonard Peltier's sup-
porters who came to live and work in 
the Kansas City area in order to sup-
port Leonard as closely and effective-
ly as possible. Leavenworth Prison, 
where Leonard is now, is only about 
40 miles from the group's location. 
Two of the members are lawyers who 
see Leonard often in order to consult 
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with him on legal matters arising 
from his case and incarceration, and 
to give him the protection and sup-
port of frequent visitors. A suit 
brought by one of the House's at-
torneys for the religious rights of 
Leonard, Standing Deer, and Albert 
Garza resulted in all three being 
released from many months in 
solitary confinement. Because of this 
work, Indian prisoners in trouble 
from all over the country call the 
House for assistance. Those calls 
stimulate calls -to prison officials, the 
media in the prison areas, and to 
local attorneys, when legal action is 
needed. A major part of the group's 
education work is a newsletter, Bayou 
La Rose. They are also very active in 
supporting the resistance to the evic-
tion of 14,000 Navajos from their 
homes in the Big Mountain area of 
the Hopi-Navajo Reservation in 
Northeastern Arizona. Resist's grant 
went towards the cost of publishing 
the newsletter. 
Special Help Needed 
For the past several years, Resist has 
been sharing a computer with several 
other progressive organizations and 
publications. However, due to the in-
creasing growth of our organization 
and the scope of our work, we have 
realized that at this point in time, 
Resist needs its own computer. Since 
we hadn't included funds for a new 
computer in our budget for the year, 
we are going to you, our supporters, 
for some special assistance. If you 
would like to make a contribution 
towards a new computer, please fill out 
the form below and send it in with your 
check. Thanks so much. 
Yes, I would like to give $ __ _ 
towards a Resist Computer. 
Name ___________ _ 
Address __________ _ 
Clty ___ State __ Zip ___ _ 
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administration's efforts to undermine 
the pillars of Costa Rica's social peace, 
Andrew Reding points out Washing-
ton's main objectives: "First, to 
reshape Costa Rica in the image of 
Ronald Reagan's United States by 
slashing social spending in favor of 
new military spending and by giving 
carte blanche to domestic and foreign 
private enterprise; and second, to ob-
tain Costa Rican cooperation in more 
firmly encircling Nicaragua with a 
strengthened southern front" (Andrew 
Reding, ''Costa Rica: Democratic 
Model in Jeopardy," World Policy 
Journal, Spring 1986, p. 302). 
Recently, the five Central American 
nations pledged to reach a comprehen-
sive agreement to end hostilities. The 
Caraballeda pledge emphasized that 
''the solution of Latin American prob-
le.ms should spring from and be en-
sured by the region itself so that the 
area will not be put into the East-West 
world strategic conflict." But as Javier 
Solis, ex-priest and the newly-elected 
senator to the legislative assembly from 
the party Pueblo Unido, sadly points 
out, ''The pressures and blackmail of 
all kinds in the middle of a tremendous 
production crisis has put the govern-
ment of Costa Rica in a weak position. 
It can't negotiate because it would lose 
the financial injection that the North-
american administration's support 
represents. It is a government prac-
tically mortgaged to U.S.AID. The 
neutrality proclamation has been 
neutralized. It has been emptied of its 
contents" (Pensamiento Propio, 
January-February 1986, p. 17). 
As the Costa Rican people so clearly 
understood before going to the polls in 
February, their small, peaceful nation 
stands to lose a rich tradition of 
political and social democracy if they 
are forced to endorse a military solu-
tion engineered in Washington. "It is 
our deep desire that when these fratri-
cidal wars end," stated President 
Monge in a letter to the U.S. House of 
Representatives last year, ''Costa Rica 
will be able to help heal the wounds of 
our neighbors. Our policy of perma-
nent, active and unarmed neutrality is 
very important if we are to have an op-
portunity to fulfill this goal." 
Maureen Dunn is a staffperson at the 
Washington Office on Latin America. 
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